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NAVIGATING UNCHARTED WATERS: THE
OPENING OF BRAZIL'S SOFTWARE
MARKET TO FOREIGN
ENTERPRISEt
INTRODUCTION
The Brazilian software market is in a state of flux. For many years
the software industry fell under the umbrella of Brazil's broader "informatics"' policy, which focused on the minicomputer and microcomputer industries. The informatics policy-the Brazilian government's
cornerstone for regulating intellectual property and technology tradeexcluded foreign participation as part of a broader protectionist strategy
designed to establish Brazilian autonomy in key industries. At least for
the software market, however, protectionist policies operated as a
double-edged sword. On the one hand, protectionism encouraged economic development in an important industrial sector. On the other
hand, erecting trade barriers for the software market conflicted with
the economic interests of many industrialized countries, including the
United States.
In the mid-1980s the U.S. government sought to undercut Brazil's
informatics policy by targeting a vulnerable market segment-software.
Two developments focused attention on the need for a specialized
software policy in Brazil. First, severe restrictions on software imports
had created a black market for U.S. software in Brazil. Second, Brazil's
failure to provide adequate legal protection for software had generated
widespread piracy of foreign and domestic software. 2 These interre-

t Copyright © 1989 by Mary S. White. This Note first appeared in volume 25 of the
Stanford Journal of InternationalLaw. The Note was awarded Second Place in the Sixth
Annual Computer Law Writing Competition (1989).
1. "Informatics" is a term used in Europe and the Third World to describe the information industries of telecommunications and data processing. The Brazilian informatics
policy is avowedly protectionist, designed to foster growth of an indigenous informatics
industry and especially the creation of a domestic minicomputer and microcomputer market.

See Recent Development, Brazilian Computer Import Restrictions: Technological

Independence and Commercial Reality, 17 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 619 (1985) (authored
by Anne Piorkowski) [hereinafter Recent Development, Computer Import Restrictions].

2. A 1987 U.S. Trade Representative report estimated that software piracy losses in
Brazil exceed $35 million annually for microcomputer software alone. The report notes
that losses may be substantially higher for all kinds of computer software. See U.S. Trade
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lated developments combined to discourage the growth of Brazil's
software industry, and they also harmed U.S. interests.
Official U.S. involvement with Brazil's software market began with
a section 301 unfair trade investigation 3 conducted by the U.S. Trade
Representative in 1985. The section 301 proceeding, authorized under
the Trade Act of 1974, is designed to encourage a less restrictive Brazilian trade policy for software as well as legal sanctions for software
piracy. Although the software controversy in Brazil is ongoing, U.S.
pressure has already achieved tangible success. Brazil's new Software
Law, enacted in December 1987, is a breakthrough that establishes
copyright protection for all software. The new law also provides a
framework independent of the informatics policy for the marketing of
software.
Part One of this Note traces the political, economic and legislative
Representative, 1987 U.S. Trade Estimate Report 13 (Nov. 1987) (unpublished report on
file with the Stanford Journal of InternationalLaw; also available in the U.S. Embassy,
Brasilia) [hereinafter 1987 Trade Estimate Report].
3. Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 authorizes the U.S. President to take appropriate action to obtain the removal of any foreign governmental practice that violates an
international agreement or unreasonably burdens or restricts U.S. commerce. See Trade
Act of 1974, § 301, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1982). A section 301 investigation, conducted by the
office of the U.S. Trade Representative, reviews alleged foreign trade restrictions or unfair practices. An investigation typically occurs after the U.S. Trade Representative receives a complaint from an affected party. Investigations can also be "self-initiated"sometimes the President directly requests the U.S. Trade Representative to review alleged unfair practices by foreign governments. Upon completion of the U.S. Trade Representative's study, the President may or may not take action under section 301 to eliminate
such restrictions or practices. Under the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988
(the 1988 Trade Act), self-initiated actions in the intellectual property area are mandatory
if certain adverse conditions exist. Two sections of the 1988 Trade Act provide a mechanism which addresses the adverse impact on U.S. trade caused by the lack of adequate and
effective protection of U.S. intellectual property rights by other countries. Section 1303 of
the 1988 Trade Act requires the U.S. Trade Representative to identify "priority foreign
countries" within 30 days after the annual section 181 Foreign Trade Barriers report is
submitted to congressional committees. The countries selected will be those that have the
most egregious acts, policies, or practices, which in turn have the greatest adverse impact
on U.S. exports and have not entered into good-faith negotiations or are not making significant progress in bilateral or multilateral negotiations to provide protection for intellectual property rights. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100418, § 1303, 102 Stat. 1107, 1179-81.
In addition, section 1301(a) of the 1988 Trade Act requires the U.S. Trade Representative to initiate an investigation within 30 days after the above-mentioned identification has
occurred. The U.S. Trade Representative must recommend action within six months of
the investigation's initiation, unless she determines this would be detrimental to the
United States' economic interest. The U.S. Trade Representative must publish in the Federal Register a list of priority foreign countries and any revisions to the list. She may revoke the identification of priority foreign countries upon submission of a written report to
Congress or add countries not previously identified if subsequent information indicates
there is a change in circumstances. Id. § 1301(a).
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history of Brazil's Software Law. Part Two describes the law's major
provisions, including copyright protection and software commercialization in Brazil. Part Three provides a substantive critique of the
Software Law, analyzing whether it adequately protects software
against infringement in Brazil. In addition, Part Three analyzes how
the Software Law restricts market access and discusses its other practical effects on Brazil's domestic software industry and on U.S. interests.
This Note concludes that progress in both the protection and market access areas of the law is needed but suggests that resolving the continuing piracy problems should be addressed first because sufficient
Brazilian-U.S. consensus currently exists to achieve immediate reform
in this area.
I. BACKGROUND
"Software treatment" in Brazil is shaped by a strongly divided set
of governmental policies and political pressures. At the heart of the issue lies the country's approach to informatics. Understanding the environment in which Brazil's Software Law was passed requires looking at
the government's informatics policy, which greatly determined the
treatment of software as the industry grew. The informatics policy also
reflected the political pressures influential in the passage of the new
Software Law, pressures that were exemplified in the section 301 inves4
tigation by the U.S. Trade Representative and in the Microsoft case.
A.

THE INFORMATICS POLICY

Upon determining, in the early 1970s, that technological independence was necessary for economic and military security,5 Brazil adopted
a protectionist policy designed to promote its domestic informatics industry. This policy attempted to improve the control of technology
transfer through the imposition of stricter legal mechanisms regarding
industrial property and technology trade. 6 Brazil also targeted certain
high technology industries (e.g., the informatics sector) for accelerated,
government-backed national support. 7 The primary intent of the policy
was to replace imported products and technologies with Brazilian
equivalents in order to foster the growth of indigenous industries.'
4. For a discussion of the Microsoft case, see infra notes 57-80 and accompanying
text.
5. See Recent Development, Computer Import Restrictions,supra note 1, at 619 n.3.
6. See Law of Oct. 29, 1984, No. 7.232 [hereinafter Informatics Law] arts. 2-3; Plano
Nacional de Informdtica (National Informatics and Automation Plan), §§ 1-2. The Plano
was developed pursuant to article 1 of the Informatics Law and provides an official informatics policy statement and guidelines.
7. Plano Nacional de Informdtica, §§ 1, 3.3.
8. For background information on the goals of Brazil's informatics policy, see A.
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The building blocks of the informatics policy are: 1) tight control
over imports of both products and technology and 2) the "market reserve.'
The "market reserve" policy refers to the creation of a protected environment for the manufacture of certain computer products
by local companies. Under the market reserve system, the Brazilian
government, not private industrialists, decides whether sufficient domestic capability exists for a computer market segment. If the government's decision is positive, it establishes legal restrictions on the entry
of foreign "computer" capital in that segment. In addition, the Brazilian government actively participates in the development of these market segments through financing schemes and purchase plans. In the
early stages of this policy, a market reserve for minicomputers was created, for which five companies qualified. Later, other market reserves
were established in the microcomputer and peripheral markets.
During the 1970s and early 1980s, implementation of the informatics policy was allocated primarily to three administrative bodies: the
Secretaria Especial de Informdtica (SEI) (Special Informatics Secretariat),10 the Instituto Nacional de Propriedade Industrial (INPI) (National Institute for Industrial Property)1 1 and the Carteirade Comercio
Exterior (CACEX) (Foreign Commerce Board of the Bank of Brazil). 12
Relying upon a combination of rules embodied in resolutions, communiBOTELHO & P. SMITH, THE COMPUTER QUESTION IN BRAZIL: HIGH TECHNOLOGY IN A DEVELOPING SOCIETY (1985); Erber, The Development of the Electronics Complex and Gov-

ernment Policies in Brazil, 13 WORLD DEV. 293 (1985).
9. See Evans, State, Capital,and the Transformation of Dependence: The Brazilian
Computer Case, 14 WORLD DEV. 791 (1986). The software market can be viewed as Brazil's latest attempt at market reserve.
10. SEI has proven to be an aggressive defender of nationalist policies in the technology area. Created in 1979, it originally operated under the National Security Council. It
now operates as a part of the Ministry of Science and Technology. For a more detailed
history of SEI, see id. at 796.
11. INPI, created in 1970, analyzes together with SEI the legal authorization required
to legitimate the importation of informatics technology. INPI is in charge of guiding and
disciplining the surveillance, control and registration of patents, trademarks and contracts
relating to the utilization of such patents, as well as directing all actions relating to contracts that involve the transfer of technology and the rendering of specialized technical
services. All licensing and technical assistance agreements, including trademark license
agreements, must be registered with INPI. INPI actively participates in technology transfer agreements as a third party. Failure to register with INPI results in denial of license
fees, trademark registration cancellation and/or expiration of the patent. For a more detailed description of INPI activities, see Rosenn, Regulation of ForeignInvestment in Brazil: A CriticalAnalysis, 15 LAW. AM. 307, 321-28 (1983).
12. According to the U.S. Trade Representative, "[v]irtually all Brazilian imports require a CACEX import license." The regulations governing license issuance provide wide
latitude for delaying or denying permission to import a wide range of products. For example, the issuance by CACEX of import licenses for computers and computer-related products, including software, requires SEI's approval. SEI will approve the importation of
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qu~s and normative acts, SEI, INPI and CACEX enforce import controls on high technology products as well as determine the terms of
technology transfers. CACEX implicitly controls technology transfer
through its financing approval for the importation of machinery and
equipment, with SEI having a veto on import financing authorization
for informatics-related products.13 INPI explicitly controls technology
transfer through its approval of licensing and technical assistance agreements, subject to SEI's veto in the informatics area. 14 The coordination
of efforts15 among SEI, INPI and CACEX results in the purchase of foreign technology only when such technology is undisputably necessary
for the present stage of Brazilian development, when it is not available
in Brazil, and when it complements Brazilian research and development
efforts.
On October 29, 1984, Brazil approved a complex new Informatics
Law codifying and extending policies followed since the 1970s.16 According to the Informatics Law, national informatics policy aims at "the
development of a national capability in informatics activities, to the
benefit of the social, cultural, political, technological, and economic development of the Brazilian society."'1 7 The informatics sector is broadly
defined as "any activity related to the rational and automatic treatment
of information"' 8 and specifically includes the "importation, exportation, production, operation, and marketing of programs for computers
and automatic information treatment machines, as well as the corresponding technical documentation (software)."'19
The Informatics Law created a new administrative agency, the Conselho Nacional de Informdtica e Automagdo (CONIN) (National Council of Informatics and Automation), which was vested with the policymaking authority formerly held by SEI.20 CONIN is answerable difinished software only if no domestic alternative exists. See 1987 Trade Estimate Report,
supra note 2, at 8.
13. Rosenn, supra note 11, at 353. As discussed in note 12, supra, almost all imports

to Brazil require a CACEX license. The CACEX license authorizes import financing arrangements. CACEX implicitly controls technology transfer through its regulations concerning import licenses. If CACEX wants to constrain technology imports, it can institute
onerous financing policies for imports in general. See id. at 3?9-32.
14. Id.
15. Critics of Brazil's implementation of the informatics

policy argue that even

though SEI's, INPI's and CACEX's roles in controlling technology transfers are interrelated, insufficient coordination among the agencies has resulted in a failure to develop a
unified approach to technology transfer. See, e.g., i&L

16. Informatics Law, supra note 6.
17. Id. art. 2.
18. Id. art. 3.
19. Id. art. 3, § 3.
20. Id arts. 6-7. CONIN is composed of several ministers of state, as well as representatives of the private sector, such as the Brazilian Association of Computer and Pe-
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rectly to the Brazilian President 2 ' and provides direction to the other
administrative bodies in the implementation of policy. 22 In practical
terms, however, the Informatics Law mandates that SEI must be con-

sulted for the solution of controversies involving informatics. The law
does not specify the roles of INPI and CACEX, but in practice these
agencies have retained their traditional responsibilities. 23 The adminis-

trative agencies together-CONIN, SEI, INPI and CACEX-currently
control the enforcement of the informatics policy.
B.

TREATMENT OF SOFTWARE PREVIOUS TO THE PASSAGE OF THE
SOFTWARE LAW

Article 43 of the Informatics Law 24 established that in "[m]atters
pertaining to computer programs and associated technical documentation (software) . ..the right to privacy [and] personal rights, because of

their scope, shall be dealt with in specific legislation to be approved by
the National Congress. ' 25 Before the passage of specific legislation for
the protection and marketing of software, however, SEI established its
own interpretation of how foreign software should be marketed in Bra-

zil and, in turn, what legal protection, if any, should be available to
26

software.

ripheral Industry (ABICOM), the Brazilian Association of Users of Computers and
Subsidiary Equipment (SUCESU), the Brazilian Association of Informatic Service Companies (ASSESPRO) and the Brazilian Association of Professionals on Data Processing
(APPD). CONIN also includes the presidents of the Confederation of Industries, the National Confederation of Trade and the National Confederation of Credit Companies; one
representative each from the National Confederation of Workers in Industry (CNTI), the
National Confederation of Workers in Commerce (CNTC) and the National Confederation of Workers in Credit Companies (CONTEC); one representative each of the Brazilian
Society for the Progress of Science (SBPC) and the Brazilian Society of Data Processing
(SBC); and one representative each nominated by the Brazilian Bar Association and the
Institute of Brazilian lawyers. The three-year appointment of the members is made by
the Brazilian President. Id. art. 6.
21. Id. art. 5, § X.
22. CONIN's most important activities include: proposing and overseeing implementation of the National Informatics and Automation Plan; deciding, as an appellate authority, issues resulting from decisions made by SEI; and establishing norms and standards for
the registration of informatics goods and services. Id. art. 7, §§ II, XIII, VIII. SEI was
subordinated to CONIN, but SEI retains certain duties such as providing technical support
to CONIN, deciding on projects for development and production and giving a prior opinion on the importation of "informatics goods and services, for a period of eight years
[through 1992]." Id. art. 8, §§ I, V, VI.
23. Interview with Sonia Homsy, Intellectual Property Lawyer, in Rio de Janeiro
(Mar. 2, 1988) [hereinafter Homsy interview].
24. Informatics Law, supra note 6, art. 8, § VI.
25. Id. art. 43.
26. SEI Normative Act No. 22 (Dec. 2, 1982) (on file with the Stanford Journal of InternationalLaw).
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SEI interpreted the Informatics Law to require that software import agreements be jointly analyzed and approved by SEI and INPI.
Acting in this capacity, INPI treated all software licensing and marketing agreements involving foreign companies as technology transfer contracts. This brought foreign software agreements under Law 5.772 of
Brazil's Code of Industrial Property, which prohibits restrictions on
marketing or exportation in any technology agreement.2 7 Various INPI
normative acts regulating technology transfer also placed procedural re28
strictions on foreign software agreements.
The treatment of software agreements in Brazil as technology
transfer contracts created several difficulties for concluding a successful
software arrangement, principally because the technology transfer contractual scheme treats software as unpatented technology. Under Brazilian informatics regulations, unpatented technology (such as software)
cannot generally be licensed, only sold. In addition to the procedural
restrictions mentioned above, INPI's onerous criteria for approval of
technology transfer agreements prevented a great number of foreign
29
software sales from taking place.
27. Law of Dec. 21, 1971, No. 5.772. The Industrial Property Code's provisions prohibit a "license [from] impos[ing] any restrictions as to the marketing or exportation of
the product covered by it" or as to "the importation of articles or material necessary for
the product's manufacture." Id. art. 29, § 2.
28. The INPI normative acts regulating technology transfer agreements include:
(a) Normative Act No. 15 (Sept. 11, 1975), which establishes that contracts of technology transfer and related matters must be approved and registered at INPI in order to
benefit from fiscal deductions governed by specific tax regulations. Registration is also a
condition for providing evidence of actual exploitation of patents within the country;
(b) Normative Act No. 32 (May 5, 1978), which requires prior consultation with
INPI before granting a technology transfer contract;
(c) Normative Act No. 60 (Mar. 24, 1982), which establishes conditions governing
technical assistance contracts between foreign and Brazilian companies; and
(d) INPI/SEI Joint Normative Act Nos. 53, 13/80 (Feb. 12, 1981), which. established a
commission composed of individuals from both agencies that meets periodically to examine recommendations for policy decisions and technology transfer contracts (these Normative Acts are on file with the Stanford Journal of InternationalLaw).
29. One device used to overcome the difficulties created by SEI's and INPI's criteria
involved Brazilian subsidiaries of foreign companies receiving the software directly from
the parent company without obtaining any governmental approval. Because software
deals are treated as technology operations, no payment of fees is allowed. Instead, remittance is made in the form of profits and dividends. Interview with George Herz, Director
of the Division of External Relations of Unisys, in Rio de Janeiro (Apr. 20, 1988); see also
M. Dos Santos, U.S. Government Memorandum Concerning Software Protection and Marketing in Brazil (Aug. 24, 1987) (unpublished memorandum on file with the Stanford
Journal of InternationalLaw; also available in the American Consulate General, Rio de
Janeiro) [hereinafter Dos Santos Memo].
Software fees also have been remitted as copyright royalties. Copyright license agreements do not have to be submitted to the Brazilian copyright office. Therefore, such
agreements are not subject to registration with the Central Bank of Brazil. In addition,
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Few foreign companies were willing to comply with the following
INPI "market reserve" requirements: 1) technology transfer agreements must allow the Brazilian licensee to freely use software products
after the agreement expires; 2) delivery of source code and all related
documentation to the Brazilian licensee is mandatory; 3) royalty payments under the agreements are limited to five percent of net sales,
although a higher fee not exceeding ten percent is sometimes possible;
4) contract duration is usually limited to five years; 5) secrecy obligations are also limited to a five-year term from the delivery of each piece
of information; and 6) no export restrictions are permitted.30 In addition, INPI did not allow agreements to restrict research and development on software products by Brazilian firms, and agreements could
not restrict access to improvements on original technology during the
31
period of the contract.
The treatment of software as "technology" subjected licensing
agreements to the market reserve restrictions listed above without providing software developers with any of the typical protections provided
to "technology" goods. For example, patent protection for software was
unavailable for two reasons. First, computer programs often do not pass
the "novelty" and "industrial application" tests required by the patent
laws.32 Second, article 9, paragraph h of Brazil's Industrial Property
Code provides that "systems and programs" are not patentable inventions. Although the statute does not expressly refer to computer programs, it has generally been interpreted to exclude software from
33
patentability.
Another inadequacy was the unavailability of contractual provisions
to protect the intellectual property rights of software owners. As previously stated, all software agreements are subject to review and approval
by INPI and SEI. Neither agency will approve a contractual clause they
deem in conflict with the informatics policy. Unfortunately, many protective clauses desired by foreign software licensors directly conflict
with that policy. For example, many software developers protect proCentral Bank authorization is not required for standard copyright remittances, such as
those relating to books or records published and distributed in Brazil. As such, some Brazilian companies have remitted software fees under the guise of payments for distribution

of user manuals.
The position taken by the Central Bank, however, is that any and all copyright payments that do not fall into specific categories (books, records, press articles and reproduction of characters) require the prior authorization of the appropriate agency. In the case
of software agreements, the prior consultation of INPI is then required. Id.
30. Dos Santos Memo, supra note 29.
31. INPI Normative Act No. 15 (Sept. 11, 1975), art. 2.5.
32. See Turner, Brazil: A Practical Guide to Intellectual Property Protection, Bus.

AM., Jan. 18, 1988.
33. Id.
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grams by restricting access to their source codes. According to the INPI
criteria for approval of a software agreement, however, delivery of a
program's source code is mandatory. 34
SEI and INPI's treatment of software as unpatented technology
may have made it easier for the Brazilian government to turn a blind
eye to the unauthorized use of foreign software goods. The regulatory
scheme devised by SEI and INPI for the importation of foreign software
did not regard software as an intellectual work subject to copyright
laws, nor did it admit any references to intellectual property or other
proprietary rights for software. 35 This ad hoc approach to the protection and marketing of software led to uncertainty, insecurity and anger
among investors and businesspersons in the international software industry. Although a more comprehensive and balanced scheme was desired by both foreign and Brazilian investors, 36 the Brazilian
government continually avoided broader regulation of software trade.
A section 301 investigation by the U.S. Trade Representative may have
prompted the Brazilian government to focus on the issue.
C.

THE U.S. SECTION 301 INVESTIGATION

Partly in response to the Brazilian government's lack of protection
for computer software and its restrictive policy on the importation of
software, the U.S. Trade Representative self-initiated a section 301 action against Brazil in September 1985 under the authority provided in
the Trade Act of 1974. 3 7 Under section 301 of the Act, the President is

authorized to take all appropriate action, including retaliation, to obtain
the removal of any foreign government's act, policy or practice that violates an international agreement or is "unjustifiable or unreasonable
34. INPI Normative Act No. 15 (Sept. 11, 1975), art. 4.

35. See supra notes 26-28 and

accompanying text.
36. A more balanced scheme was desired by foreign software manufacturers because
they wanted to enter the Brazilian market. Much software technology was not "transferred" because one of the Brazilian governmental agencies would refuse to approve an
agreement or a foreign licensor of software would be dissuaded by all of the conditions
imposed by Brazil's Byzantine regulatory scheme. See Rosenn, supra note 11, at 358.
Many Brazilian companies wanted more accessible regulations because they were deprived of needed technology and were forced to settle for inferior products. See id.
37. Although section 301 procedures clearly allow the President to act on his own initiative, the Reagan administration did not initiate an investigation on its own motion until
September 7, 1985. See Howell, Benz & Wolff, International Competition in the Information Technologies: Foreign Government Intervention and the U.S. Response, 22 STAN.
J. INT'L L. 251, 255 n.164 (1986). On that date, the President directed the U.S. Trade Representative to initiate three section 301 investigations for allegedly unfair foreign practices. One of the investigations concerned the Brazilian informatics policy. See Weinraub,
Reagan Orders Moves Against Trade Partners,N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1985, at Al, col. 5.
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and.. . burden[s] or restrict[s] United States commerce. '38 Once an injury determination is made by the U.S. Trade Representative, the President is given wide latitude in choosing a response. Typically a
retaliatory measure or an international agreement formalizing market
access is chosen. 39 In the ongoing section 301 investigation concerning
Brazil, consultations with the Brazilian government have focused on the
market reserve policy, intellectual property protection for software, and
the elimination of barriers to foreign investment in the informatics
area.
Although the efficacy of section 301 has been questioned,40 it has
proven extremely effective in shaping the development of the Brazilian
Software Law. The first hint of influence can be seen in the May 1986
Sdo Paulo State Supreme Court decision holding that existing Brazilian
copyright law applied to software.4 1 This court's action marked the first
time a Brazilian governmental body officially admitted any kind of protection for software. Interestingly, the court chose the protection model
for software desired by the United States that had been unacceptable to
Brazilian bureaucrats then debating the issue of software protection.
This favorable decision by the court also came shortly after the White
38.
39.

Trade Act of 1974, § 301, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1982).
In attempting to gain access for U.S. exporters into foreign markets, section 301

may be very effective because of its range of available remedies. Presidential retaliation
or threats of retaliation can be used as a political tool in negotiating with foreign governments to eliminate their market barriers. The remedy of formal agreement implies that
the foreign government's "unjustifiable" policy will be rendered reasonable. Overall, section 301 may be the only U.S. trade remedy available that can counter a foreign government's anticompetitive activities when that government is attempting to develop a
national industry through a strong protectionist posture. See Howell, Benz & Wolff,
supra note 37, at 253 n.155.
40. See, e.g., Note, Defining Unreasonablenessin InternationalTrade: Section 301 of
the Trade Act of 1974, 96 YALE L. J. 1122, 1133-36 (1987) (authored by Patricia I. Hansen).
41. Sinclair, a British company, was the plaintiff in this case. Sinclair sued three Brazilian companies, two of which allegedly copied into their personal computers the keyboard, functions and read-only-memory (ROM) of Sinclair's computers. Sinclair
complained that the third Brazilian company published a photograph depicting diagrams
of Sinclair computers. The lawsuit relied on Brazilian copyright laws. Defendants' response denied the application of Brazilian copyright laws in this case. The trial court
judge, basing his conclusion on a report submitted by a court-appointed expert, found that
no copying had occurred. The trial judge thereby refrained from deciding whether copyright laws applied to this fact situation.
On appeal, the Sdo Paulo State Supreme Court responded to the controversy by first
addressing the issue of the copyrightability of software. The court admitted that there
was no consensus on this issue but refused to review the arguments advanced by the
plaintiff and the defendants. The court sidestepped the issue of software's copyrightability by assuming that software should be protected by the copyright laws. The
court did not have to reach the issue expressly because it concluded tha Sinclair wanted
protection for hardware, not software. Since hardware cannot be afforded copyright protection, Sinclair's suit could not stand. Dos Santos Memo, supra note 29.
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House Economic Policy Council had formed a working trade group to
devise retaliatory actions against Brazil. Given the circumstances, it is
understandable why the United States interpreted the court's decision
as a signal that pressures from the section 301 investigation were effectively leading Brazil to implement a protection regime for software. 42
Additional evidence of compromise by the Brazilian government resulting from mounting political pressure can be deduced from the publication of a parecer (opinion) by CONIN in September 1986. The parecer
stated that software should be afforded protection under the "author's
rights" copyright legislation, with certain adaptations. 43 The CONIN
opinion, like the Sio Paulo State Supreme Court decision, marked a
clear shift in the Brazilian government's position. Until the publication
of the parecer, the only non-judicial governmental view regarding
software protection was the possibility of establishing a sui generis44 regime-an unattractive scheme from the U.S. viewpoint. The political
motivations behind the opinion seem evident. The parecer was issued
immediately before Brazilian President Jos6 Sarney's visit to the
United States. Furthermore, Brazilians were increasingly concerned
that inactivity on their part would lead to retaliatory measures from the
United States. 45 The recommendation, however, had no legally binding
effect. From a diplomatic perspective, the CONIN opinion demonstrated the Brazilian government's willingness to avoid a harsh confron42. See 1987 Trade Estimate Report, supra note 2, at 13.
43. CONIN parecer No. 001/86 (Sept. 22, 1986), cited in Dos Santos Memo, supra
note 29.
44. A sui generis regime refers to legislation enacted specifically for computer
software. Some commentators believe that the special properties of computer software
make it difficult to provide protection for proprietary interests in software by amending
existing intellectual property laws. They urge the adoption of sui generis legislation, on
the order of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Model Provisions. See
Note, InternationalProtectionof Computer Software: The Need for Sui Generis Legislation, 8 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 511 (1986) (authored by Howard K. Szabo), for a general discussion of the proposals for sui generis legislation. See also WORLD INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, MODEL PROVISIONS (1978) (on file with the Stanford Journalof
InternationalLaw).
45. Interview with Francisco Ramalho, President of the Associa~5o Brasileira das
Empresas de Servigos de Informtica-Nacional (ASSESPRO) (Brazilian Association of Informatic Service Companies), in Rio de Janeiro (Apr. 19, 1988). Throughout the section
301 investigation, the threat of possible sanctions concerned the Brazilians. As late as
February 1988, an article in the Jornal do Brasil, one of Rio de Janeiro's most respected
daily papers, informed readers of the threat of sanctions. See Garcia, Sanq6es estdo indefinidas, Jornal do Brasil, Feb. 1, 1988, § 1, at 13, col. 1. The article reflected Brazilian
fears that had been brewing since the inception of the U.S. section 301 investigation in
1985. It mentioned President Reagan's "sword" of sanctions and the constant battle the
Brazilians faced in fending off these threats. For a U.S. report of Brazil's diplomatic efforts to head off threatened sanctions, see Brazil Fights Back, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1988, at
A16, col. 6.
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tation with the U.S. government. It also indicated that Brazil might
accept the prevailing international principle of recognizing intellectual
property protection for software.
Within a month, the Reagan administration determined that Brazil's informatics policies were an "unreasonable" trade action under section 301. 4 6

To allow time for further consultations with Brazil, the

President deferred his decision on actions to be taken until the end of
1986. 4 7 On December 9, 1986, just before the deadline for action on the
section 301 complaint, Sarney sent the Brazilian Congress a bill containing provisions specifying intellectual property protection for software
and regulating software marketing.48 From a U.S. perspective, the bill
provided sufficient copyright protection because it was specifically
linked to the existing Brazilian copyright act. 49 Unfortunately, preservation of software market reserve and related commercial restrictions
were also part of the legislation. 50 While the section 301 action seemed
to provide an impetus for intellectual property protection for software,
it did not appear effective in helping to open the Brazilian market to
U.S. software products. Nonetheless, because the bill did provide a protective scheme for software, the U.S. government directed the U.S.
Trade Representative to continue negotiations with Brazil and delayed
any retaliatory decision until July 1, 1987.51
On June 24, 1987, shortly before the new deadline for retaliation,
52
the Brazilian software bill was approved by the Chamber of Deputies.
As a result, President Reagan directed the U.S. Trade Representative to
suspend the intellectual property rights section of the section 301 case
and to monitor the passage of the bill through Brazil's Senate.5 3 While
the bill progressed through the Brazilian Senate, the U.S. Trade Representative scrutinized all significant actions taken by the Brazilian government in the software sector. Finally, when SEI denied a license
sought by six Brazilian computer hardware firms to use Microsoft Corporation's MS-DOS operating system, President Reagan reevaluated his
46. See Farnsworth, Reagan Imposes Punitive Tariffs Against Brazil, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 14, 1987, at A38, col. 1.
47. 1987 Trade Estimate Report, supra note 2, at 19.
48. Projeto de lei, No. 8.551, signed Dec. 9, 1986 (on file with the Stanford Journal of
InternationalLaw).
49. Id. art. 2.
50. See id. art. 3.
51. Riding, Brazil Will Renegotiate its ParisClub Debts, N.Y. Times, Dec. 20, 1986, at
A39, col. 6.
52. Riding, Software Copyright Bill Moves Ahead in Brazil, N.Y. Times, June 26,
1987, at D1, col. 1.
53. 1987 Trade Estimate Report, supra note 2, at 13.
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decision to delay retaliatory action. 54
On November 13, 1987, the Reagan administration ordered the imposition of punitive tariffs on $105 million worth of Brazilian imports.5
A specific hearing was to be held by the U.S. Trade Representative to
determine which Brazilian exports would be affected. The most likely
5
candidates included shoes, civilian aircraft and earthenware products. 6
The threat of actual retaliation seemed to move the software bill
through the Brazilian Congress, and in December 1987 the government
passed legislation dealing with the software issue.
D.

THE MICROSOFr CASE

Another facet of the U.S.-Brazilian debate on software can be seen
in the Microsoft case. The Microsoft controversy began in the first
months of 1986, shortly after the U.S. section 301 investigation was initiated.5 7 In those initial months, several international companies, including Microsoft Corporation, discovered that the number of personal
computers in Brazil exceeded 500,000.58 This large base of personal
computer users indicated Brazil's potential importance as a market for
software. The companies decided to conduct a survey to determine
which operating systems were being used for 16-bit microcomputers, a
popular-sized personal computer.5 9 Results from the survey could be
considered disturbing-five of the large Brazilian microcomputer manufacturers were copying Microsoft's operating system without authorization. 6° Microsoft contacted the five Brazilian companies and the
companies agreed to request SEI's authorization to import Microsoft's
operating system, MS-DOS, under a licensing agreement. 1 Consequently, the five companies submitted a "Memo of Understanding" between them and the Microsoft Corporation to SEI on November 24,
1986.62

The objective of the agreement was to give the Brazilian companies
54. Farnsworth, Software Curb Eased in Brazil, N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 1987, at D5, col.
6 (inter city final ed.).

55.
56.
57.
marks
Law).
58.
59.

Id.
Farnsworth, supra note 46, at Al, col. 2.
G. Neves, Information and Market Reserve Law in Brazil 19-20 (Dec. 3, 1987) (reat the CLE seminar in Miami) (on file with the Stanford Journal of International
Id.
Id.

60. Id.

The five Brazilian microcomputer manufacturers involved in this survey were

Itautec Informitica, Microtec Sistemas Indfistria e Com6rcio, Polymax Informitica, Sid
Informatica and Labo Eletr6nica.
61. Id.; see also CONIN parecer No. 001/88 (Jan. 20, 1988), para. 1 [hereinafter
CONIN's Microsoft opinion].

62. See CONIN's Micrsoft opinion, supra note 61, para. 1.
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licensing rights to distribute, reproduce and modify, for a three-year period, Microsoft's MS-DOS operating system.6 3 The Brazilian companies
were to receive MS-DOS version 3.0 as well as updates to be released
over the three-year period.6 4 The contract gave the Brazilian companies
the right to export their microcomputers together with the assigned
MS-DOS operating system.6 5 Under the agreement, Microsoft was
obliged to furnish the Brazilian businesses with the same terms and
conditions offered to other clients.66
SEI reviewed the request over a ten-month period. The agency
evaluated whether the agreement complied with the "transfer of technology" regulations devised by SEI, INPI and CACEX.6 7 As previously
mentioned, in keeping with the informatics policy, one criterion for the
purchase of foreign technology was that no similar technology be available in Brazil. Thus, part of the evaluation included an analysis of existing Brazilian operating systems for 16-bit microcomputers to
determine whether a "similar" operating system existed in Brazil. SEI
denied approval of the agreement on October 6, 1987.68 The agency
based its denial on the existence of three "functionally equivalent" operating systems developed by Brazilian manufacturers: SISNE, by
Scopus Tecnologia; SSDDO-SA, by Empresa SSD; and TK MULTIDOS,
by Microdigital.6 9 SEI claimed that the three Brazilian operating sys70
tems were similar to MS-DOS.
Two of the five companies--Sid Informktica and Polymax Informitica-appealed the decision to CONIN. 71 The most interesting is63. Id. para. 2.
64. Id.
65. I&
66. Id, para. 3.
67. See supra informatics policy section, notes 1, 5-25 and accompanying text. SEI
Normative Act No. 22 (Dec. 2, 1982) was the legal instrument that guided SEI in this decision. G. Neves, supra note 57, at 20, para. E.
68. See CONIN's Microsoft opinion, supra note 61, para. 5. The parecer, in relating
the history of the five companies' request, cites SEI/SEXEC Communiqua No. 110/87 as
the basis for SEI's refusal. Id.
69. Id. para. 8.
70. SEI's decision that SISNE was functionally equivalent to MS-DOS was based primarily on an analysis of MS-DOS 3.0. Apparently, SISNE was the most important of the
three operating systems. See A Decisdo do Conin Estabelece um Empate, 78 TEMA 8-9
(1988). Although many will concede SISNE's similarity to MS-DOS 3.0, later MS-DOS
versions have superseded the technology of 3.0. Microsoft technicians claim that there is
no Brazilian-produced program similar to later MS-DOS generations. SEI's reasoning,
then, appears to be that if Brazil has a program functionally equivalent to MS-DOS 3.0,
future generations of the Brazilian program should be protected against foreign competition as well. Applying the test of "functional equivalence" in this broad manner suggests
that a very narrow category of software programs could ever be imported. See id at 3-9.
71. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text for an explanation of CONIN's role
in the appeal process.
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sue raised on appeal had a legal basis: the bill currently in the Brazilian
Congress would make it necessary to reverse SEI's decision. The petitioners were confident that the passage of the bill into law would mean
the narrowing of the functional equivalence definition.72 In January
1988 CONIN met to decide on the appeal. Its opinion reflected a political compromise. 73 CONIN attempted to pacify the United States while
also recognizing SEI's authority in the informatics area and upholding
the concept of functional equivalence.7 4 CONIN affirmed SEI's decision
that Microsoft's MS-DOS versions 3.0, 3.1 and 3.2 could not be commercialized in Brazil. At the same time, however, it modified the decision
in order to authorize the registration and commercialization of version
3.3 of MS-DOS. 75 CONIN reasoned that a modification of the decision

was necessary because no functional equivalent of version 3.3 existed at
the time that Sid Informitica and Polymax Informitica requested regis76
tration of MS-DOS.
CONIN's decision indicated the desire of the Brazilian government
to evade the threatened U.S. sanctions. The agency was pressured to resolve the Microsoft controversy in a manner that would signal to the
U.S. government the Brazilian government's goodwill.77 And, although
Brazil was not assured that the section 301 reprisals would be dropped,
CONIN's action seemed to significantly reduce the tension between the
United States and Brazil. 78 CONIN's reasoning conveyed a message
that the Software Law allowed reversal of the decision because it "is
more flexible and liberal" in its similarity test definitions than SEI's
72. In CONIN's Microsoft opinion, supra note 61, para. 6, a discussion of Sid Informitica and Polymax Informitica's appeal includes the two companies' basis of appeal.
The companies reason that the bill, soon to be passed into law, has a narrower definition
of functional equivalence.
73. Interview with Ricardo Saur, Ex-Director President of Serviqo Federal de Processamento de Dados, in Rio de Janeiro (Apr. 19, 1988) [hereinafter Saur interview]. Mr.
Saur, a participant in the CONIN decision, admitted to the political nature of the decision.
He emphasized, however, that he believed this decision was in the best interest of Brazil.
The decision was designed, in his opinion, to benefit the national informatics sector by establishing clearer and more democratic mechanisms for the similarity/functional equivalence evaluation. Yet CONIN's Microsoft decision seems more of an ad hoc decision than
one meant to provide guidelines for later use. See also A Decisdo do Conin Estabelece um
Empate, supra note 70, at 3-4.
74. Saur interview, supra note 73.
75. A Decisdo do Conin Estabelece um Empate, supra note 70, at 3-4.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. After the announcement of the CONIN decision in January 1988, numerous accounts in U.S. newspapers reported progress in the U.S.-Brazilian computer software dispute. This progress, in turn, delayed the imposition of sanctions by the United States.
See, e.g., Riding, Brazil Accepts One US. Software Product, N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1988, at
D8, col. 4; US. Delays Brazil Action, N.Y. Times, Mar. 1, 1988, at D1, col. 4.
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Normative Act 22-the instrument used originally to deny Microsoft
79
permission to market MS-DOS.
The decision, however, did not really clarify how future requests
for the cataloguing and commercialization of foreign software would be
evaluated. The Software Law itself, described below, is unclear about
the evaluation procedure. The Implementing Regulations, while providing clarification on the procedural aspects of cataloguing requests, do
not give adequate definition to the "similarity" or functional equivalence test. The broad definition of functional equivalence given in the
Software Law is duplicated in the Implementing Regulations. This approach suggests that ad hoc decisionmaking by SEI will be the standard
for determining what foreign software can be marketed in Brazil.
Results from the Software Law's first year in effect indicate that
the ad hoc decisions of SEI on the functional equivalence issue have
been favorable to foreign software manufacturers. As of April 1989, an
estimated 4,000 foreign software products have passed the functional
equivalence test and may be commercialized in Brazil.8 0 Although
SEI's decisionmaking has favored foreign software manufacturers thus
far, the flexible standard for approaching similarity decisions may lead
to unfavorable reviews in forthcoming years. Perhaps politics, as seen
in the Microsoft case, will continue to influence marketing questions in
the future.
II.

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE SOFTWARE LAW

The Software Law contains three major chapters: the first discusses the protection of software, the second regulates sales of software
in Brazil, and the third spells out the applicable penalties.
A.

PROTECTION

Article 2 of the 1987 Software Law extends Brazilian copyright protection to software.8 1 It also adds that some modifications of the copy82
right law are needed to account for particular features of software.
8
3
The text of the law does not refer specifically to "software" but to
79. CONIN's Microsoft opinion, supra note 61, §§ I-I.
80. Telephone interview with Georges Fischer, an intellectual property lawyer from
Sio Paulo (Apr. 3, 1989) [hereinafter Fischer interview]. See also infra notes 117-26 and
accompanying text for a more complete description of the functional equivalence test
under the Software Law.
81. Law of Dec. 18, 1987, No. 7.646, art. 2 [hereinafter Software Law].
82. Id.
83. The term "computer software" has created much confusion. See Caswell, The
Classif'wation of Software: A Logical and RationalApproach, 24 JuRIMETRIcs J. 377, 380
(1984),

noted in

International Protection of Computer Software: The Need for Sui

Generis Legislation,supra note 44, at 511 n.4. The definition of computer program in the

1989]

THE OPENING OF BRAZIL'S SOFTWARE MARKET

543

computer programs, which are defined in article 1 as "expression[s] of
an organized set of instructions, in natural or code language, contained
in a physical support of any nature, for necessary use in automatic machines for information treatment, devices, peripheral instruments or
equipment, based on digital technique, to make them operate in determinate manner and for determinate purposes."' 4 This definition of
computer programs closely parallels international standards as it resembles the World Intellectual Property Organization's description.8 5
Article 3 in turn provides that the term of protection for software is
twenty-five years. The protective term begins once the software is introduced into any country.8 6 Introduction of a computer program is defined as "the moment at which the author of the program utilizes it or
puts it at the disposal of others."8 7 Non-Brazilian software is entitled
under article 3 to the same copyright protection in Brazil, provided that
citizens and residents of Brazil are guaranteed a reciprocal grant of protection for their software in the other country.8 8 Thus, a software program protected by copyright in the United States should be protected
automatically by copyright in Brazil.
As with other Brazilian copyrights, and in accordance with the international standards on copyrights embodied in the Berne Convention,8 9 the protection of software does not depend on the formalities of
registration or enrollment with SEI. 90 However, the author may regisBrazilian Software Law is significant because the rapid change in computer software technology may make some definitions of software obsolete rather quickly.
As noted in the text above, the Brazilian definition seems to parallel closely the international standard, as it resembles the World Intellectual Property Organization's description of computer programs. It remains an open question whether this definition will
adequately describe "software" in the future, and, consequently, whether future generations of "software" will be protected under existing laws.
84. Software Law, supra note 81, art. 1.
85. The World Intellectual Property Organization's glossary defines a computer program as "[a] set of instructions capable, when incorporated in a machine-readable medium, of causing a machine having information-processing capabilities to indicate, perform
or achieve a particular function, task or result." WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, GLOSSARY OF TERMS 53 (Pub. No. 816) (1980).
86. Software Law, supra note 81, art. 3.
87. Decree of May 12, 1988, No. 96.036, art. 6 [hereinafter Software Law Implementing Regulations].
88. Software Law, supra note 81, art. 3(2).
89. The Brazilian Copyright Law contains in article 117 a mandate that the Conselho
Nacional de Direito Autoral (CNDA) (National Copyright Council) will "determine, orientate, coordinate, and supervise the necessary provisions to exactly apply the laws, treaties, and international conventions ratified by Brazil, concerning author's rights." Law of
Dec. 14, 1973, No. 5.988, art. 117 [hereinafter Brazilian Copyright Law]. Brazil is a party to
the Berne Convention which requires its signatories not to condition copyright protection
on registration formalities.
90. Software Law, supra note 81, art. 3(1).
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ter it at an agency to be designated by the Conselho Nacional de Direito
Autoral (CNDA) (National Copyright Council) to establish prima facie
evidence of ownership.9 1 The registration requires that the author deposit with the agency portions of the software and related data necessary to establish authorship and the identity of the software. 92 This
information is confidential and will be disclosed only under a court or93
der or at the request of the owner.
Ownership rights to software developed during employment or
while under a service contract will belong exclusively to the employer
contracting for the services, except where otherwise provided in the
contract. 94 The law contains a confusing provision concerning ownership in article 6. Article 6 establishes that autonomous and independent
ownership rights to changes in or derivatives of a software program will
belong to the authorized person who makes the changes if the parties
agree to such a provision. 95 This article seems unnecessary because article 5 provides for the possibility of parties stipulating who will be the
owner of rights to the software. As such, it would follow that the parties have the same rights to changes or derivations of the same
software, as derivative software programs incorporate the original copy91. Id. art. 4.
92. Id. art. 4(1). CNDA has designated INPI as the agency responsible for accepting
software registration applications. Chapter II of the Software Law Implementing Regulations establishes the procedure for registration of computer programs. It provides that registration requests be accompanied by: 1) the title of the computer program; 2) the name,
date of birth, nationality and domicile of the author; 3) the date on which the computer
program was concluded; 4) an indication of the date and locality of release of the computer program; 5) if the computer program is a derivative work, an indication of the original work accompanied by a document of authorization; 6) an indication as to whether the
computer program was developed by an employee, consultant or lessor of services; 7) an
indication of the programming languages used in the development of the program; and 8)
excerpts of the program that both characterize its independent creation and identify the
program. Software Law Implementing Regulations, supra note 87, arts. 8-9. See also
Communiqu6 No. 93 (May 20, 1988), reprinted in Diirio Oficial [D.O.] (May 23, 1988), for
the operating instructions that accompany the Software Law and its Implementing Regulations. The Implementing Regulations are unclear as to whether the excerpts required
must be in source or object code. Presumably, object code will suffice provided it identifies the software and demonstrates that the software is an independent creation.
93. Software Law, supra note 81, art. 2(3).
94. Id art. 5. Article 5's ownership provision on software programs made for hire is
in accordance with international practice. See, e.g., Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.A.
§ 201(b) (1977). Sections 201-205 of the 1976 Copyright Act cover copyright ownership and
transfer under U.S. law. Section 201(b), like article 5 of the Brazilian Software Law, provides that "[in the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for whom
the work was prepared is considered the author.., and, unless the parties have expressly
agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised
in the copyright."
95. Software Law, supra note 81, art. 6.
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righted work. Overall, article 6 does not clearly establish how someone
who does not own the right to a copyrighted software program can autonomously exercise rights to derivative works of the same software.
The chapter on software protection concludes with article 7, which
includes a list of actions not considered to be copyright infringement.96
The list of non-infringing activities includes: 1) occurrence of a similarity between two software systems when such similarity arises innocuously; 2) similarity resulting from compliance with the requirements of
the law or with regulations or technical standards; or 3) similarity occurring because of a restriction on alternative forms of expression.9
Article 7's broad language may provide a loophole to shelter pirated
copies of software programs. A software pirate may take a copyrighted
program and adapt it in a manner which allows the activity to fall
within one of the above-listed categories. As such, any similarity between the "adapted" pirated copy and the original copyrighted software
program would be non-infringing activity. An interpretation of article 7
that narrowed the categories of non-infringing activities would provide
greater intellectual property protection to software owners.
B. MARKETING AND COMMERCIALIZATION OF SOFTWARE
1.

Cataloguing9s

Article 8 of the Software Law provides that a software program,
whether developed by a Brazilian or non-Brazilian company, must be
catalogued with SEI before marketing efforts may begin in Brazil.
While article 1 of the law states that the production and marketing of
software are unrestricted in Brazil, the text of the law demonstrates
that any freedom from restriction is fictitious. In article 8, the law establishes that SEI will classify software into different categories, depending on its origin. SEI must take into account whether the software
was developed abroad or in Brazil and, if developed in Brazil, whether
solely by national companies 99 or in association with non-national
96. Id. art. 7.
97. Id art. 7(3).
98. SEI refers to the process of commercialization or marketing of computer software
as cadastramento (cataloguing) and to the process of obtaining copyright as registromento
(registering). To avoid the confusing tendency in translation to refer to both processes as
a "registration," this Note will follow the Portuguese terminology.
99. For purposes of the Software Law, a Brazilian national company is defined as a
company that is: 1) organized and principally domiciled (i.e., having its head office) in
Brazil; and 2) under the permanent, exclusive and unconditional control, whether directly
or indirectly, of individuals residing and domiciled in Brazil. A Brazilian company will be
deemed "controlled" by Brazilian individuals only if such individuals 1) have decisionmaking control over the company, 2) own 100% of the voting capital and at least 70% of
the total voting and non-voting capital of the company, and 3) have "technical control"
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companies.'0°
Although classification has no influence on software copyright protection, it does influence the marketing of software. The ability of nonnational companies to market the software will be conditioned on the
absence of similar software developed by a national company. 1° 1 Additionally, cataloguing with SEI is a condition precedent to the validation
of legal "acts" by the Central Bank. Non-catalogued programs will not
receive the necessary Central Bank approval for remittance of foreign
currency in payment for the programs.
In article 9 the law establishes that enrollment with SEI will be
valid for three years and will be renewed automatically by SEI if no
similar national software exists. If similar national software has been
developed, however, SEI will refuse to renew the catalogued status that
is needed to market the software. Under article 10, original computer
programs independently developed are defined as similar if: 1) they are
functionally equivalent, with the ability to operate in similar equipment
and processing environments and with substantially the same performance characteristics considering the purposes of their application; 10 2 2)
they meet established national standards, if applicable;10 3 and 3) they
execute substantially the same functions, taking into account the kind
of application intended and the characteristics of the Brazilian
04
market.'
2. Distribution/Marketing
Article 27 provides that the economic exploitation of software must
be covered by license or assignment agreements "freely" established between the producer and the distributor. These "free" agreements, however, are subject to the approval of the proper entities of the executive
government.' 0 5 Also, article 27 stipulates that certain clauses shall be
considered null and void. Included in this category are clauses estabover the company (i.e., the legal and de facto power to determine the development, generation, acquisition, transfer and composition of products and production technology). See
Informatics Law, supra note 6, art. 12. Any company that does not meet these criteria is
considered a non-Brazilian company that can only have a software program catalogued
with SEI if a similar program has not been developed by a Brazilian company. See supra
note 12.
100. Software Law, supra note 81, art. 8.
101. Id art. 8(2).
102. Id. art. 10(a).
103. Id. art. 10(b).
104. Id. art. 10(d).
105. The "proper entities" are SEI and INPI, with SEI responsible for the cataloguing
of software and INPI responsible for added approval when the software involves a technology transfer contract. See Software Law Implementing Regulations, supra note 87, art.
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lishing exclusivity; those limiting production, distribution or marketing;
and those exempting any of the parties from liability for any third party
06
action due to errors, defects or infringement of copyrights.
Article 28 permits only national companies to distribute software,
unless the software is intended for equipment produced either abroad
or in Brazil, but marketed by non-national companies.'0 7 In effect,
these exceptions only apply to software for mainframe computers. For
example, software produced in the United States for a Burroughs mainframe may be enrolled at SEI and marketed in Brazil regardless of the
existence of similar Brazilian software.
The articles regarding distribution and marketing also regulate the
remuneration for an author residing or domiciled abroad by establishing
that the licensing and assignment agreements will be approved and recorded only if they stipulate a fixed price per copy that does not exceed
the average price charged worldwide for the distribution of the same
product.'0 8 Payments calculated on the basis of production, income or
profits of the assignee or user will not be allowed.' 0 9 Articles 27-29
clearly demonstrate that contractual freedom in software marketing is
not a reality.
3. End-Users
In its provisions for end-users, the Software Law contains one liberating opportunity for the marketing of foreign software. It provides
that an end-user may import a single copy of a software program for its
exclusive use. 0 These imports are not subject to the cataloguing requirements discussed above."' In its regulations, SEI clearly took note
of the legislators' intent in drafting the Software Law to facilitate the
direct importation of software by end-users. Other software programs
not subject to the cataloguing requirement include those imported by an
end-user for its exclusive use when the programs are: 1) associated with
machines, equipment and devices based on digital technology, or 2) resident and integrated in machines, equipment and devices based on digital technology when such programs are not marketed separately from
2
the product in which they are contained."
Some unusual provisions designed to protect consumers of software
also appear in the law. 113 In general, articles 23-26 guarantee that the
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Software Law, supra note 81, art. 27.
Id. art. 28.
Id, art. 29.
Id,
Id. art. 30.
Software Law Implementing Regulations, supra note 87, art. 14(1).
Id art. 14(II)-(III).
Software Law, supra note 81, arts. 23-26.
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user will receive, during the period of technical validity of the software,
114
corrections of any errors as well as complementary technical services.
During the same validity period, the software may not be withdrawn
from the market without fair compensation for any damages caused to
third parties." 5 The holder of rights over computer programs is also re16
sponsible to the consumer for adequate technical quality.1
4. FunctionalEquivalence
In SEI's Implementing Regulations, the agency's evaluation of the
"national similar" or "functional equivalent" is a significant indicator of
the restrictiveness of the agency vis-d-vis software developed by non-national companies. In examining a non-national company's software for
similarity, SEI will look at its current list of catalogued national companies' software programs to determine whether the non-national
n7
software program is similar to any program on this list.

The determination of functional equivalence itself is a result-oriented three-prong test. The first functional equivalence issue is
whether the non-national company's software product has "substantially the same performance characteristics" as the catalogued national
company's product." 8 SEI's evaluation of similarity under this prong is
conducted by measuring the memory requirements, processing time and
the number of users and systems for each of the two programs. 1 9 To
be similar, these parameters must produce essentially the same
20
result.'
Functional equivalence under the second prong depends upon
whether the two programs operate in similar equipment in similar environments. 121 Determination of this aspect of similarity means that the
program developed by the non-national company is compatible with
equipment and operating systems in Brazil, as is the national company's
122
comparable program.
The final prong of functional equivalence is determined by establishing whether the two programs "execute substantially the same func114. Id-art. 24.
115. Id,art. 25.
116. Id. art. 26.
117. Software Law Implementing Regulations, supra note 87, art. 17(1).
118. Software Law, supra note 81, art. 10; Software Law Implementing Regulations,
supra note 87, art. 3.

119. Software Law Implementing Regulations, supra note 87, art. 3(b).
120. Id. art. 3(a).
121. Software Law, supra note 81, art. 10; Software Law Implementing Regulations,
supra note 87, art. 3(c).
122. Software Law Implementing Regulations, supra note 87, art. 3(c).
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tions."'1 2 3 SEI's evaluation in this area will again look to results. The
results here are the outputs for a specified set of entry data. If the two
programs present equivalent outputs for the same entered data, the programs will be considered "similar" under this prong of the functional
equivalence test.
As previously mentioned, in the first effective year of the software
law, SEI has granted most foreign software manufacturers' cataloguing
requests. Consequently, the functional equivalence test has not
presented a cumbersome barrier to commercialization. 124 Although the
number of refusals based on the existence of a functionally equivalent
Brazilian software product is small, 125 a foreign manufacturer intending
to market software in Brazil should not assume that the functional
equivalence test has become pro forma. If functional equivalence is at
issue in a cataloguing request, the foreign manufacturer may find itself
facing a series of bureaucratic hurdles to overcome. 126
C.

PENALTIES

The Software Law provides both criminal and civil penalties for
copyright infringement. Copyright infringement is punishable by fines
(not yet determined) and by imprisonment for six months to two
years. 12 7 Those who import, display or store software of foreign origin
that is not catalogued correctly face imprisonment for one to four years
123. Software Law, supra note 81, art. 10; Software Law Implementing Regulations,
supra note 87, art. 3.
124. See supra text accompanying note 80.
125. Georges Fischer estimates that less than 1% of foreign manufacturers' cataloguing
requests have been refused. Fischer interview, supra note 80.
126. Andreia A. Comes, a transactions lawyer in Rio de Janeiro, described the difficulties she encountered while attempting to catalogue a U.S. software manufacturer's product at SEI. Unknown to her, a Brazilian software manufacturer had contested the
cataloguing request of Ms. Comes' client. SEI, upon receipt of the Brazilian company's
claim of functional equivalence, halted the U.S. company's cataloguing request. Contrary
to its responsibilities, SEI did not contact Ms. Comes, the U.S. company's attorney, so that
she could respond to the Brazilian company's claim. Fortuitously, Ms. Comes learned of
the contested claim through unofficial channels and was able to put together materials to
dispute the existence of functional equivalence. Ms. Comes notes that while overall the
number of denials based upon functional equivalence may be small, if there is a dispute as
to the existence of a similar Brazilian product, SEI's bureaucratic inefficiencies in handling such contested claims may result in denial or long delays in securing cataloguing approval. In her client's case, it has been one year since the cataloguing request was initially
submitted to SEI. Although approval is expected shortly, her client still has not received
official notification of acceptance. These delays will increase the costs of marketing products in Brazil, and if the number of contested claims increases, one might expect foreign
software manufacturers to be dissuaded from attempting to enter the Brazilian software
market. Interview with Andreia A. Comes, attorney with the law firm of Stroeter,
Trench and Veirano, in Rio de Janeiro (Apr. 3, 1989).
127. Software Law, supra note 81, art. 35.
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and a fine. 128 In addition to criminal action, a civil action for injunctive
relief, including seizure of illegally produced software copies, may be
filed by the injured party.1 29 Other remedies include compensatory and
punitive damages that will be assessed on a daily basis until the in30
fringement ceases.'
D.

ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE

The Software Law works within the administrative structure established by the Informatics Law--CONIN, SEI, and INPI-with the addition of the Central Bank and CNDA. SEI's role under the new
legislation is to catalogue the software, including software developed by
non-national companies. Also, SEI is responsible for the renewal of
software cataloguing, analysis of computer program development
projects and the issuance of opinions regarding any importation of computer programs.' 3 ' INPI plays a role under the Software Law only
when technology transfer is an issue.' 32 INPI's direct participation
would be required where parties to a commercialization agreement decide to transfer software technology or where SEI decides that a transfer of software technology is essential to Brazil's development strategy.
CONIN becomes involved when an appeal from an SEI decision is
presented.' 3 3 The Central Bank of Brazil continues in its traditional
role of authorizing remittance payments of foreign currency for imports, including software programs imported by the final user and destined for its exclusive use. i 34 CNDA, a very new member to this
administrative structure, is responsible for selecting an agency to regulate the registration of software, deciding on appeals from registration
135
denials and issuing norms that regulate the registration process.
E.

VETOED PROVISIONS

As passed by the Brazilian Congress, the Software Law included a
number of provisions that were subsequently vetoed by President
128. Id, art. 37.
129. Id. art. 39.
130. Id.
131. Software Law Implementing Regulations, supra note 87, art. 7(11).
132. Id art. 7(111).
133. Id, art. 7(I).
134. Id. art. 7(V).
135. Id. art. 7(IV). CNDA has designated INPI as the entity that will handle the registration of software programs. Apparently, CNDA was not consulted about its obligations
under the Software Law or the Implementing Regulations and decided to avenge itself by
thrusting the registration responsibility onto INPI. In turn, INPI has made the registration process complicated through excessive formalities. Although INPI's complications
are burdensome, they are not disastrous because neither software protection nor marketing is dependent upon registration with INPI. Fischer interview, supra note 80.

1989]

THE OPENING OF BRAZIL'S SOFTWARE MARKET

551

Sarney. The most important vetoed provision mandated the inclusion
of a surcharge on imported computer programs as a second criterion for
licensing the product in Brazil. 13 The idea behind the provision was to
create a fund for technical development in the software sector with the
monies received through imposition of the surcharge. The fund, in
turn, would have been used to finance national companies apt to develop "Brazilian" programs. This veto has caused the most controversy
and thus is an item that may be reconsidered by the Brazilian
13 7
Congress.
III.

ANALYSIS

The Software Law mixes rules on protection with rules on marketing, although the two issues have independent provisions. In both areas,
the law deserves some criticism.
The copyright protection scheme embodied in the law leaves many
open questions. One basic question concerns what software is protected.
While the law supposedly grants legal protection to all computer programs, 1 3 8 the definition of computer program does not make clear
whether both application and operating system programs are eligible
for copyright protection. 139 Confusion arises from this vague definition,
and it may lead to arbitrary decisions by SEI. For example, software in136. Software Law Implementing Regulations, supra note 87, vetoed arts. 16-22. For
the content of the vetoed provisions, see 0 projeto do "software" recebe um novo texto,
Gazeta Mercantil, Nov. 12, 1987, at 14, col. 1.
137. Upon receiving notice of President Sarney's vetoes, Francisco Ramalho, then president of the Brazilian Association of Informatic Service Companies (ASSESPRO), sent a
telegram to Sarney commenting on the grave mistake of his action. Ramalho stated that
Sarney's vetoes essentially took away the market reserve system in the software area and
"transform[ed] the mechanism of market reserve, which depends on SEI's discretion in
determining functionally equivalent national programs, into the principal protection for
local software." Telegram from Francisco Ramalho, President of the Brazilian Association of Informatic Service Companies, to President Jose Sarney (Jan. 4, 1988) (discussing
presidential vetoes of portions of the Software Law) (on file with the Stanford Journalof
InternationalLaw).
Ramalho's association is an important lobbying group in the development of the
Software Law. The association would argue that a temporary market reserve system is
necessary for local development, yet it recognizes the need for a system that does not entirely alienate foreign software producers. Ramalho's association does not credit any official or private entity with the capability of determining which programs should be barred
for being "national similars," given the speed and diversity with which software applications evolve. The views of organizations like ASSESPRO are important since they
demonstrate opposition to President Sarney's vetoes. Such opposition may in fact lead to
a reconsideration of the vetoed provisions by the Brazilian Congress. Interview with
Francisco Ramalho, former President of the Brazilian Association of Informatic Service
Companies, in Rio de Janeiro (Apr. 19, 1988) [hereinafter Ramalho interview].
138. Brazilian Copyright Law, supra note 89, art. 1.
139. Id
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cluded in ROM (read-only-memory) plates could be construed as ineligible for protection. It is unfortunate that the Implementing Regulations
do not clarify whether distinctions in legal protection exist between various types of programs.
The protective scheme outlined in the Software Law is unclear as
well in its treatment of ownership of derivative works. Generally, according to Brazilian copyright law, works derived from other existing
works are protected as autonomous creations. 1 40 The economic exploitation of such derivative works, however, may only be independent
if authorized by the owner of the original work. 141 The Software Law
deals with this issue only rudimentarily. Article 6 attributes rights to
technological changes and derivatives to "the authorized person who
makes the changes."'142 It is unclear how "authorization" occurs. The
law is also ambiguous about who owns the economic rights to such
changes. Given the market reserve policy, this issue is particularly important. Perhaps article 6 is meant to be a loophole allowing indeterminately "authorized" adapted copies to be autonomous creations, with
concurrent rights to economic exploitation. The Implementing Regulations should be amended to restrict rights to economic exploitation of
derivative software to only those cases where express authorization has
occurred.
In the Software Law's first year in effect, no protection issues have
been litigated. Nonetheless, because of the law's imprecise definition of
protected programs and its vagueness with respect to ownership of derivative works, software piracy continues to occur in Brazil. Both Brazilian and foreign software manufacturers should act quickly to combat
this piracy by pursuing copyright infringement test cases in Brazilian
courts. 1 43 Failure to test the scope of protection through legal actions

most likely will result in continued uncertainty. Judicial decisions in
this area would aid both Brazilian and foreign software manufacturers
by providing clearer guidelines and greater definition to the protection
outlined in the software legislation.
140. l art. 4(VI)(g).
141. Id art. 6(XII). Authorization is required because the independent use of the derivative work would involve a reproduction of, or at least a benefit from, the work of the

author of the original work.
142. Software Law, supra note 81, art. 6.
143. Francisco Ramalho of the Brazilian Association of Informatic Service Companies
notes that the continuance of software piracy is a key issue that must be faced by Brazilian manufacturers if they want to foster a local industry. As such, in his opinion, the market must be disciplined through legal actions. Because the need for protection is
recognized by both Brazilian and foreign software manufacturers, a joint legal action

designed to demonstrate the strength of legal protection embodied in the Software Law
should be undertaken. Interview with Francisco Ramalho, former President of the Brazilian Association of Informatic Service Companies, in Rio de Janeiro (Mar. 31, 1989).
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Vague language also muddles the provisions affecting the marketing, sale and other forms of commercial distribution of software. Normally, Brazilian copyright protection extends rights to the author of a
literary, artistic or scientific work "to use, profit from and dispose of a
...work" and to "authoriz[e] its use or exploitation, in whole or in part,
by third parties."'144 The Software Law, however, complicates the economic rights found in copyright protection by introducing a number of
rules and regulations regarding the commercialization of software. The
most burdensome of these provisions, from a U.S. standpoint, is also the
most amorphous; cataloguing by SEI, which is a prerequisite to marketing in Brazil, will not be made when foreign software is deemed to be
"functionally equivalent" to an already existing national software
product.
Although SEI, in the law's first effective year, has liberally con5
strued the functional equivalence test, 14 there is no guarantee that future evaluations will generate positive results for foreign software
manufacturers. The law's definition of "functionally equivalent" remains ambiguous and may trigger inequities due to subjective interpretations by SEI and to SEI's unwillingness or technical inability to
recognize improvements. 1 46 Products that perform equivalent functions
may have radically different levels of performance, quality and availability. Yet, the Software Law does not recognize such distinctions. Furthermore, the law requires this evaluation every three years, when all
1 47
software in the market must have its enrollment renewed. .
It is possible that SEI's current generosity in granting foreign
software manufacturers' cataloguing requests is due to SEI's rather
weak political position. 148 Since SEI's defeat in the Microsoft case in
1 49
If SEI
January 1988, the agency may feel that its power is slipping.
increased its political strength, the ambiguous "functionally equivalent"
provision might be interpreted to exclude many foreign software products, even those with current commercialization authorization. In order
to avoid the possibility of SEI adopting a chameleonic posture in applying the law, the Implementing Regulations should be amended to more
precisely define the term "functionally equivalent."
The provision nullifying any clauses restricting the exportation of
software products is also problematic. Although the desire of Brazilian
companies to export licensed software products is understandable, the
144. Brazilian Copyright Law, supra note 89, art. 29.
145. See supra text accompanying note 84.
146. In this regard, recall the Microsoft case. See supra notes 57-77 and accompanying

text.
147. Software Law, supra note 81, art. 9.
148. Fischer interview, supra note 80.

149. IdL
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blanket coverage of this article creates obstacles to the execution of
marketing agreements for foreign software. The laws of many foreign
countries restrict exportation of technology products. For example, the
U.S. Export Administration Act of 1979 imposes restrictions on the reexportation of certain products, and U.S. companies are obligated to ensure that their licensees or distributors respect such restrictions. 15° Because of this legitimate and frequently encountered restriction by
foreign countries, the Implementing Regulations should be amended to
accommodate such foreign laws.
The legislative provision for regulating remuneration in the marketing of foreign software also needs to be clarified. As structured, the
law provides for remuneration to be a fixed sum per copy, in accordance
with international practice, and it does not allow any other kind of payment.151 The legality of payment for associated technical documentation is unclear. In most cases, the distributor will need the source code
to be able to render support and technical assistance services, yet the
law does not address payment for the source code. By avoiding these
two controversial questions, the legislature left the issue of remuneration confusing and uncertain. Clarification is needed on whether separate payments for the user manual and the source code are allowed.
Even if payment for user manuals is forbidden, payment for the delivery of the source code should be allowed in accordance with international practice.
A related aspect of remuneration that is creating problems for Brazilian distributors of foreign software is the difficulty they experience in
sending remittances out of Brazil.152 The Software Law's Implementing
Regulations provide the Central Bank with authorization to remit foreign currency for payment of SEI-approved and end-user computer program imports. Unfortunately, due to hard currency problems faced by
Brazil and to bureaucratic entanglements, the Central Bank is not cooperating.153 Distributors are thus faced with long delays in securing official approval to remit payments to foreign software manufacturers. If
the Central Bank continues to be uncooperative, distributors will face
increased transaction costs. An increase in costs to the distributors
translates into higher costs for foreign software manufacturers as well.
Foreign software producers desiring to export products to Brazil will
need to consider market distortions that may be caused by the Central
Bank's dilatory responses to remittance requests. The Implementing
150.
151.
152.
153.

Export Administration Act, § 5, 50 U.S.C. § 2404 (App. IV 1986).
Software Law, supra note 81, art. 29.
Fischer interview, supra note 80.
Id.
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Regulations or the Software Law should be amended to rectify the Central Bank's uncompromising attitude.
Reintroduction of the vetoed surcharge on software imports also
would improve the Software Law. A surcharge might lead to Central
Bank cooperation by easing the hard currency problem. If the
surcharge was borne by the foreign software producer, fewer dollars
would exit the country. An alternative suggestion is an amendment
designed to reduce hard currency concerns by allowing free remittance
for foreign software at fluctuating exchange rates. 154 Remittance at the
fluctuating free market rate of exchange would more accurately reflect
distribution costs and would eliminate Central Bank concerns that
software remittances create a dangerous opening for the exit of hard
currency at low official rates of exchange.
A final criticism of the law concerns an important economic aspect
of copyright protection-the right to prevent unauthorized third parties
from infringing the intellectual property right attached to computer
programs. Compared with the penalty established for the clandestine
entry of foreign software for marketing in Brazil (imprisonment for
one to four years and a fine), 5 5 the penalty for infringement of the
software owner's rights is very light-imprisonment for six months to
two years and a fine. 156 The penalty for software copyright infringement is also lighter than the penalty imposed for the infringement of
non-computer program copyrights-imprisonment for one to four years
and a fine. 15 7 In view of the repeated practice of software piracy in Brazilian territory, it seems equitable that the penalty for infringement of
software rights be amended to at least equal the penalty established for
non-computer program copyrights-imprisonment for one to four years
and a fine.
A.

EFFECTS ON BRAZILIAN SOFTWARE MARKET

Brazilian businesspersons are concerned about the effect of the law
on the Brazilian software market. In their view, the law does achieve a
legal framework for software protection and commercialization, but its
inadequacies reflect various concessions made in order to appease U.S.
interests in the short-term. 158 As a result, they believe the law lacks coherence and will prove ineffective in treating the complex questions associated with software development and marketing.
For example, the market reserve policy embodied in the law is con154. Id.
155. Software Law, supra note 81, art. 37.
156. Id art. 35.
157. C6DIGO PENAL [C.P.], art. 184(1).
158. Ramalho interview, supra note 137.
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sidered counterproductive to the development of a national software industry.15 9 The industry views this system, in which the primary
mechanism for the market reserve is SEI's evaluation of a product's
"functional equivalence," as allowing a governmental agency too much
60
discretion in deciding which foreign products are subject to exclusion.'
The uncertainty resulting from discretionary use of the functional
equivalent exclusion will discourage national development because Brazilian developers will not know whether they can count on the protection of the "market reserve."'1 6 ' Senator Roberto Campos, who opposed
the functional equivalent provisions of the law, asserts that because of
the functional equivalence test, Brazil will not develop competitive
62
software products.'
To aid in the development of competitive products, Brazilian
software manufacturers believe that a better plan for market protection
is necessary. In the industry's opinion, software is now the only area of
informatics products in which Brazilian manufacturers must compete
on even terms with foreign manufacturers. i 63 If the market protection
scheme for Brazilian software is not made more predictable and exclusive than the "functional equivalence" test, the Brazilian software market is likely to be characterized by a decrease in local development of
software and a corresponding increase in the number of Brazilian distributors of foreign software.' 64
One beneficial impact of the new law is the development of more
sophisticated distribution channels in the Brazilian software market.
Due to the number of foreign products entering the Brazilian market, a
radical change in software distribution channels has occurred.' 65 Prior
to the passage of the Software Law, Brazilian software producers paid
little attention to the importance of distribution channels in the marketing of products.' 66 Since competition with foreign products was legally nonexistent, Brazilian software manufacturers did not contend
with foreign manufacturers for room on distributors' shelves. With the
onslaught of foreign products now legally available in Brazil, domestic
manufacturers need to evaluate closely the distributor's role in the com159. Id
160. Id
161. In Francisco Ramalho's opinion, the best instrument for promoting national development of software, combatting piracy and regulating software is the (vetoed)
surcharge on software products combined with minimal oversight on SEI's part. Ramalho
interview, supra note 137; see supra text accompanying note 136.
162. Interview with Senator Roberto Campos, in Brasilia (Mar. 29, 1988).
163. Id
164. Id.
165. Interview with Francisco Ramalho, former President of the Brazilian Association
of Informatic Service Companies, in Rio de Janeiro (Mar. 31, 1989).
166. Id
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mercialization of software products. An examination would benefit
Brazilian manufacturers by increasing their knowledge of the distribution channel's importance in software marketing. Also, benefitting from
this knowledge, Brazilian software manufacturers could expect to compete more effectively with foreign manufacturers in Brazil as well as
abroad.
B.

IMPACT ON U.S. COMPANIES

The Software Law provides some legal protection to U.S. software
companies where none existed before. The new law has not eliminated
software piracy, 16 7 and thus far legal recourse is available only in theory. To bridge the gap between theoretical and actual protection, a
software copyright infringement test case is necessary. Ideally, such a
test case would determine the scope of protection afforded by the law,
as well as establish the Software Law's deterrent force. Most Brazilian
software experts agree that mere passage of the Software Law has discouraged some piracy of U.S. software products. 168 U.S. companies victimized by piracy, however, need judicial action to give teeth to the new
law. Until unauthorized use of software is punished through civil fines
and criminal sentences, U.S. companies will continue to suffer losses.
These losses include the transfer of economic benefits from legitimate
U.S. software producers to local counterfeiters, pirates and other
infringers.
A second major change engineered by the Software Law is the
opening of the Brazilian market to U.S. companies. Before 1988, the Informatics Law's market reserve system effectively excluded all foreign
software manufacturing companies from legally competing in Brazil.
Notwithstanding the legal barriers, some U.S. software (mostly pirated
copies) was available on the black market. Beginning in 1988, the
Software Law established an independent market reserve system for
software, opening Brazil's market to foreign products overcoming the
"functional equivalence" test. Thus far, SEI's application of the test has
allowed U.S. companies broad access to the Brazilian software market.
SEI, however, has substantial discretion, and a different interpretation
of functional equivalence could close the door to U.S. companies that
was opened by the software legislation of December 1987. U.S. software
manufacturers should, therefore, monitor the implementation of the
functional equivalence test and seek to narrow the definition of functional equivalence in their favor. In addition, U.S. software manufacturers should resist Brazilian efforts to supplement the market reserve
system for software by adding restrictions that go beyond the functional
167. Fischer interview, supra note 80.
168. Id.
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equivalence test. If Brazil institutes stricter market reserve mechanisms, SEI's current approval of most foreign software cataloguing requests is likely to be discontinued.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Brazilian and American software concerns should continue to track
software developments in Brazil with particular attention. The
Software Law has altered dramatically the protection, marketing and
commercialization of software. Political and judicial action is still
needed, however, to ensure protection against software copyright infringement and to harmonize Brazilian and U.S. interests regarding
market access. Because a consensus between Brazilian and U.S. companies currently exists in this area, efforts should begin with bringing test
cases against software pirates to deter infringement. A judicial finding
of copyright violations in such cases, combined with imposition of civil
and criminal penalties, would signal software pirates that infringement
will not be tolerated. Furthermore, joint legal action by Brazilian and
U.S. software manufacturers aimed at piracy is needed to send a clear
message that infringement of neither Brazilian nor foreign software is
acceptable. Interests are at loggerheads, however, regarding access to
Brazil's software market. Brazilian companies seek a restrictive market
reserve system to insulate their products from competition. In contrast,
U.S. companies will continue to resist Brazilian efforts to exclude foreign software. It is unlikely that U.S. and Brazilian interests ever will
converge completely on this issue. However, by focusing on areas of
common interest, Brazilian and U.S. advocates can help forge a more
productive and profitable software market in Brazil.
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